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Admiral:
Waddle must bear
responsibility
But 'I know he is not a criminal'
By Gregg K. Kakesako
Star-BulletinCmdr. Scott Waddle, Annapolis class of 1981, had what it took to become the admiral in charge of the submarine force in the Pacific.
Raising Ehime Maru
But for eight minutes on Feb. 9, Waddle chose to take over the control of the USS Greeneville rather than let his staff run the nuclear attack submarine as it prepared to demonstrate an emergency surfacing maneuver off the coast of Oahu.
That changed the course of history, as one Navy investigator said last week, and the Greeneville rapidly surfaced, slicing into the hull of the 190-foot fishing trawler Ehime Maru.
Nine people were lost when the trawler sank within 10 minutes.
Yesterday, Rear Adm. Albert Konetzni, commander of the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force, told a three-admiral panel in its second week of fact-finding that he loved Waddle as "a brother and as much as my son."
"He was a very caring individual," Konetzni said.
"I wanted this man to be what I have become. This man was running a good ship."
Admiral's damning testimony
But Konetzni, who recently was promoted to a three-star admiral, said as he kept reviewing the events that led to the collision between the Ehime Maru and the Greeneville, he can only conclude that it was Waddle who must bear the responsibility for failing to delegate."He has the obligation, truly the obligation to make sure the area above is clear," said Konetzni. "That's what caused this collision, plus the fact that the stars and the moon and a few other things weren't going right."
In the most damning testimony since the court of inquiry began March 5, Konetzni said it was the two times when Waddle "took the conn" in the sub's control that were the deciding factors.
However, Konetzni agreed with a Navy investigator who said that Waddle, who assumed command of the Greeneville in March 1999, was not criminally negligent. Waddle was relieved as captain of the sub a day after the accident, pending the outcome of the inquiry.
The first "decision point" was when Waddle ordered the Greeneville to periscope depth and then a few minutes later he crossed another point when he sent it down to 400 feet on an emergency deep order.
"That stopped the team," said Konetzni, referring to the intricate command structure in the submarine service.
Up to that point, Lt. j.g. Michael Coen had "the conn" as the officer of the deck, but when Waddle stepped in to speed up the preparations for the emergency main ballast blow, he upset the command structure in the control room and should have exercised more caution and the willingness to rely on his crew.
Waddle failed to give his crew adequate time to analyze the sonar surface contacts and then to visually ensure through his periscope that there were no obstacles before ordering the Greeneville to surface.
When a commander did what Waddle did, Konetzni said, "then you better be right."
Konetzni said there was "inappropriate, inadequate and improper backup."
"The backup on this situation was time and he told time to go away," Konetzni said.
'It wasn't a joy ride'
He repeated his contention under cross examination by Waddle's attorney, Lt. Cmdr. Kimberlie Young, making chopping motions with his hand as he ticked off the sequence of events where Waddle took control of the submarine as it prepared for the surfacing demonstration.In Konetzni's view of the world he said Waddle had three sonar contacts that needed closer scrutiny since he knew Oahu was near. As he demonstrated how he would have directed the periscope to home in on each sonar contact, Konetzni said the Greeneville captain had to verify that the area at each point was clear.
Konetzni also disclosed that Waddle helped determine that Greeneville's sole mission on Feb. 9 was to entertain 16 civilians.
The Greeneville was supposed to leave at 2 p.m. on Feb. 9 and spend the weekend at sea on a training mission, Konetzni said.
But some portions of the training were deleted, Konetzni added. So Waddle and Capt. Richard Snead, his squadron commander, decided to schedule the one-day trip for the civilians.
"It wasn't a joy ride," Konetzni added. "I detest that word ... It was training."
Repeatedly, the Navy's Pacific Fleet submarine boss said the eight minutes that began when Waddle took control of the Greeneville and went to periscope depth without adequately analyzing the sonar contacts, then his failure to spend enough time peering through the periscope to ensure there were no surface vessels caused the accident.
"If the skipper doesn't take the proper precaution," Konetzni said, "even surfacing from periscope depth can be dangerous."
After a visit to the Greeneville in March 2000, Konetzni recalled telling Waddle "don't run too fast, let them (crew) catch up."
He said Waddle reminded him of himself when he was a submarine skipper. "Hey, slow down," said Konetzni, in explaining to the court what he told Waddle a year ago. It wasn't a warning.
"Give them (crew) the opportunity to grow. You're smart, but give them the opportunity."
The first-term retention rate for sailors on the Greeneville was 65 percent -- double the Navy's rate, Konetzni said. It only had a 5 percent attrition rate. "It lost only one sailor," he added.
"This ship was unbelievable," the sub admiral said.
In closing his testimony, Konetzni said: "I know he (Waddle) is not a criminal."