JALALABAD, Afghanistan » Nearly a year into a new war strategy for Afghanistan, the hardest fighting is still ahead, but already it is clear that the biggest challenge lies not on the battlefield but in the governing of Afghanistan itself.

That has been the early lesson of the American-led offensive in February in Marjah, in Helmand Province, where most Taliban insurgents either were beaten back or drifted away. Since then, Americans and Afghans have struggled to establish a local government that can win the loyalty of the Afghan people, something that is essential to keeping the Taliban at bay.

The success of the far larger offensive in the coming weeks in Kandahar, the Taliban heartland, may well depend on whether Afghans can overcome their corrosive distrust of President Hamid Karzai's government.

Karzai was confronted with that issue when he met with American officials this week, including President Barack Obama on Wednesday. The two leaders seek to repair months of badly strained relations and come together at a crucial moment, both for the NATO countries involved in the fighting and for Afghanistan itself. Obama plans to begin withdrawing American forces a little more than a year from now.

If the timetable is not daunting enough, an April report by the Pentagon to Congress found that by most measures, the country is, at best, only a little better off now than it was a year ago. Progress so far appears well off pace to meet the American goals.

The insurgency has spread to some new places, notably the north and northwest of the country, although it has diminished in a few areas. It is now made up of more than half a dozen groups with different agendas, making it that much harder to defeat, or negotiate with, even if the Americans and Afghans could agree on a strategy for doing so.

In 120 districts that the Pentagon views as critical to Afghanistan's future stability, only a quarter of residents view the government positively. And the government has full control in fewer than a half dozen of these districts.

Despite the commitment of more troops by Obama and a new strategy that has emphasized the protection of Afghan civilians, few in Afghanistan believe that a functional government that holds the country together can be created on the timetable outlined.

“;It was very unrealistic to think that in 18 months they would be able, with the Afghan government, to secure a very large part of the country which is insecure today,”; said Nader Nadery, a commissioner on the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, who travels extensively around the country. “;Look at only Marjah. It took such a long time just to secure that area.”;

The timeline also leaves many Afghans reluctant to back the Americans and the Afghan government, because they fear that the members of the NATO coalition may be leaving soon, Nadery said. The point was echoed by European diplomats.

“;I did not anticipate the increasing sense of uncertainty among Afghans that Americans and Europeans will pack their bags and leave the country in the coming weeks and months,”; said Vygaudas Usackas, who recently arrived in the country to serve as the European Union's special representative to Afghanistan.

“;We all understand we can't succeed by 2011,”; Usackas said.

Even as American troops clear areas of militants, they find either no government to fill the vacuum, as in Marjah, or entrenched power brokers, like Karzai's brother in Kandahar, who monopolize NATO contracts and other development projects and are resented by large portions of the population.

In still other places, government officials rarely show up at work and do little to help local people, and in most places the Afghan police are incapable of providing security. Corruption, big and small, remains an overwhelming complaint.

“;People are tired of the Taliban, but they also don't want cops to shake them down, they don't want power brokers who are so corrupt they impact their lives and livelihood,”; said a senior officer who works closely with Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the NATO commander for Afghanistan.

The challenges are clearly visible in eastern Afghanistan, where the military has come to recognize the limits of American power in this wild terrain. The United States abandoned two combat outposts in the east over the past year — one in Nuristan and the other in the Qurangal Valley, in Kunar Province.

Col. Randy George of the Fourth Brigade Combat Team, Fourth Infantry Division, who has responsibility for the four easternmost provinces, tries to build relationships with tribal leaders in most of his territory, at gatherings called shuras, although he has given up ground to the insurgents in some areas.

The strategy inevitably means allowing the insurgents some havens, as long as those are in sparsely populated areas where the insurgents are unlikely to have much impact. George said he hoped that if he could embolden Afghan citizens to combat corruption in the more populated river valleys and provincial towns in their areas, they would at least create a government they could support, rather than help the insurgents who attack it.

“;We're not worried about corruption in itself, but we are worried about governance,”; George said.

“;Part of that is making sure that we are continuing to connect the Afghan people to the Afghan government as a whole, and when you've got a rotten piece of that, the people don't want to connect to it,”; he said.

During the past year, elders in the east banded together in three districts in Laghman Province to force out three corrupt police chiefs, and in Kunar and Nuristan, they forced out two district governors.

But entrenched officials, some of them Karzai allies, sometimes undercut the efforts, and tribal dynamics are infinitely complicated. In Nangahar, a major effort by the military to persuade a large tribe to sign on to a pact to keep out the Taliban drew criticism from the powerful provincial governor, Gul Agha Shirzai, who appeared to fear that the pact would undercut his power. Since then, no similar pact has been approved.

Such pacts and agreements to oust local leaders require multiple meetings with villagers and elders. Several days a week, George flies to remote districts to meet with tribal elders, listen to their complaints and try to cajole them into supporting the Afghan government.

This is retail politics; valley by valley, village by village. In a meeting earlier this spring in Asmar, a remote district near the border with Pakistan, elders berated him for giving money earlier in the year to corrupt district leaders — underscoring how difficult it is for the Americans to pick reliable local allies. And by the time the Americans know who is who, they are on the verge of rotating out of Afghanistan.

One village elder at the outdoor meeting looked at George and said: “;You are giving the money to individuals and not to the community. Look at the directors of government agencies, look at the cars they are driving, look at the houses they build — where does that money come from? It's our money.”;

Diplomats who have spent years in the country working with Afghans give the Americans credit for trying, but they warn that it is easy to underestimate the complexity of Afghan tribal relationships and the profound antipathy for the government.

“;One of my Afghan friends always says, 'You want a shura, I can organize one for you in 24 hours,”;' said Thomas Ruttig, a former German diplomat in Kabul and an expert on the country. He founded the Afghanistan Analysts Network. “;The problem is, do you have the right people?

“;When you give out money, you might end up supporting one side in a local conflict — and not realizing that it's roulette,”; Ruttig said.