U.S. can reduce nuclear threat by reducing its own arsenal

RECENT international events and upcoming U.S. elections provide an opportunity for progress on reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons. The importance, and urgency, is illustrated by the current crises involving nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran and instability in Pakistan and the Middle East. U.S. nuclear policy is crucial to further progress and needs careful examination. Two different approaches have been advocated. Action by citizens is necessary to stimulate formulation of a U.S. policy that helps reduce the nuclear threat.

The approach I support emphasizes international actions leading toward nuclear disarmament. This might seem like a utopian goal, but the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obliges the United States and other nuclear-weapon states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Specific actions supporting this approach have been advocated for some time but were given added emphasis in the Jan. 4, 2007, Wall Street Journal commentary by former Secretaries of State George Schultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Sen. Sam Nunn. In April the Union of Concerned Scientists released a statement by 95 prominent scientists recommending several practical steps supporting this approach.

THE OTHER approach hopes to deter major attacks on the United States by maintaining nuclear attack capability. It is illustrated by a July 2007 statement by the current secretaries of energy, defense and state. This statement contends that the United States needs a reliable replacement warhead (RRW) to replace aging warheads in the current arsenal and suggests that the United States might need to resume nuclear testing to certify existing weapons if the RRW is not approved by Congress. This and other U.S. statements, notably the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, imply that the United States intends to maintain a sizable nuclear arsenal indefinitely.

Some reduction in nuclear arsenals is consistent with either approach. The 2002 Moscow Treaty will reduce deployed U.S. and Russian strategic weapons to 2,200 by the end of 2012. However, this treaty does not require that the undeployed weapons be dismantled, so several thousand could be kept in storage and there are no negotiations to address this issue or further reductions. Furthermore, the Moscow Treaty relies on provisions in the 1991 START Treaty, which expires in 2009. Therefore, it is unclear whether there will be further reductions.

The more serious danger is that the nonproliferation regime based on the nonproliferation treaty will unravel. It is already under stress because the three countries that have not signed it (Israel, India and Pakistan) have nuclear weapons, and four countries (Iraq, North Korea, Iran and Libya) violated their treaty commitments and had secret nuclear programs. If the United States continues to maintain that it needs nuclear weapons, it is unlikely other countries will give up theirs. Regrettably, the 2005 treaty review conference ended without any substantive agreements.

ANY APPROACH dealing with the threat posed by thousands of nuclear weapons has risks and uncertainties. Because risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorist use are greater when there are large numbers of nuclear weapons, I believe there is less risk for the United States and the world in moving toward nuclear disarmament than in maintaining U.S. weapons and hoping other countries won’t develop or use them.

There are a number of actions that the United States should take. The Senate should ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which it rejected in 1999. The START and Moscow treaties should be extended and negotiations for further reductions in U.S. and Russian arsenals should start immediately. The United States should examine reducing its arsenal to a few hundred nuclear weapons, as recommended in a National Academy of Sciences study of U.S. policy in 1997.

There are also actions that the United States should not take. Congress should not fund new nuclear weapons such as earth-penetrating weapons or the RRW. It should not fund development or testing of antisatellite weapons, whether ground- or space-based. Antisatellite weapons are not nuclear weapons but would undermine stability by threatening satellites that provide warning of missile launches and other military activities.

WHAT CAN citizens do? They can learn about efforts to reduce the nuclear threat from organizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists. They can ask their members of Congress to support further reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal and to oppose development of new nuclear weapons and anti-satellite weapons. Hawaii residents could ask Sen. Daniel Inouye about a recent statement suggesting that Congress consider allowing deployment of space weapons.

Citizen involvement is needed because international efforts toward nuclear disarmament are stalled in part by lack of U.S. commitment and leadership. Action by citizens worldwide helped to achieve the existing treaties banning nuclear tests and limiting proliferation. U.S. political leaders and presidential candidates need encouragement from citizens to take the actions necessary to eliminate the nuclear threat.

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CORRECTION Thursday, June 5, 2008 U.S. Sen. Daniel K. Inouye has consistently opposed having weapons in space. In a May 4 commentary, University of Hawaii physicist Michael Jones wrote, "Hawaii residents could ask Sen. Daniel Inouye about a recent statement suggesting that Congress consider allowing deployment of space weapons." The statement apparently alluded to a March 11 report in the online publication CongressNow, in which Sens. Inouye and Bill Nelson of Florida were misquoted.