[ OUR OPINION ]
9/11 panel’s goals
merit bipartisan supportTHE broad brush of blame swept by the bipartisan commission investigating the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, should prevent it from being exploited by either party in this year's elections. The commission instead recommended institutional changes in government -- both executive and legislative -- that should be implemented in the same unanimous, bipartisan tone presented in its book-length report.
THE ISSUE
The commission investigating the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorism attacks has recommended significant changes in the government's intelligence operations.
The commission's main recommendation is creation of a new national intelligence director's post to supervise the work of more than a dozen agencies. The cabinet-level intelligence czar, confirmed by the Senate, would direct a National Counterterrorism Center. Commission vice-chairman Lee Hamilton said it would "unify all counterterrorism intelligence and operations across the foreign and domestic divide in one organization."
Such a White House office would replace the Terrorist Threat Integration Center created by President Bush last year under the supervision of the director of central intelligence. The new intelligence czar would have control over intelligence budgets throughout the government. In addition, the commission called for a specialized intelligence service within the FBI, endorsing steps already taken by FBI Director Robert Mueller.
Congressional oversight has been hampered by intelligence activities being spread over the jurisdiction of dozens of committees, the commission concluded. It recommends that both the House and Senate establish permanent committees to oversee domestic security.
As sensible as those recommendations might seem, they are likely to find stiff opposition within both Congress and the administration. Legislators can be expected fight to hold onto their terrain, such as the defense appropriations turf of Senator Inouye. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld will not easily forfeit control over the 85 percent of the intelligence budget now assigned to the Pentagon.
Sen. John F. Kerry, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee, endorsed the commission's report and called upon Congress to quickly implement its recommendations. Bush praised the panel for "very constructive recommendations" but did not immediately commit to them.
"It is not our purpose to assign blame," said Thomas H. Kean, the former Republican governor of New Jersey who was the commission's chairman. "Our goal is to prevent future attacks." The commission did say the ability of al-Qaida to launch its successful attacks of 9/11 was due to "failures of imagination, policy, capabilities and management."
Any decision to find specific blame may have repeated the flawed rationale in a 1942 report by a six-week commission headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts. The Roberts commission made scapegoats of Adm. Husband Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Walter Short, the two senior military commanders in Hawaii, for dereliction in the 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. Creating such scapegoats sidesteps the real issues, and impedes constructive change.
The 9/11 commission's decision to avoid controversy left some questions unanswered. Former Clinton and Bush counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke complained that the commission's report made no mention "about a number of things, like what effect is the war in Iraq having on our battle against terrorism. ... What they didn't do is say that the country is actually not safer now than it was then because of the rise in terrorism after our invasion in Iraq."
Clarke's complaint is valid, but making such evaluations would have jeopardized the constructive goals recommended by the commission. Those questions will continue to be addressed in the political arena.
