Asian Outlook
Ralph A. Cossa
N.Korea’s unequivocal
behavior makes
Washington’s job easierWashington's strategy of applying international pressure to further isolate North Korea appears to be working, thanks to the actions of one country in particular.
No, I am not talking about China, although China's willingness finally to get tough with the North and its hosting of the trilateral talks in Beijing in April -- which put senior U.S. and North Korean (and Chinese) officials at the same table for the first time since last October -- certainly have been helpful. Nor am I talking about South Korea, although President Roh Moo-hyun's politically courageous decision to move closer to the U.S. position and warn of "further steps" has been instrumental to the process.
The country that deserves the most credit is North Korea itself, simply by being its typical belligerent, uncompromising, threatening self.
Let's review the bidding. The crisis began in October, when Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly visited Pyongyang and informed the North that Washington would not make new agreements until Pyongyang stopped cheating on its previous commitments. A complete, verifiable, immediate halt to North Korea's clandestine nuclear programs was a prerequisite to further progress. Washington later sweetened the pie by promising a "bold approach" toward Pyongyang, including economic assistance, but only after it abandoned its nuclear programs.
At first, both sides were criticized for being too stubborn. Pyongyang said it would discuss the matter directly only with the United States, while demanding a nonaggression pact as the quid pro quo for stopping its programs. Meanwhile, Washington insisted there would be no negotiations until Pyongyang honored its previous commitments, but promised to deal with the issue diplomatically. Pyongyang immediately escalated the crisis by expelling International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors and announcing that it was restarting its reactor at Yongbyon and was going to reprocess its spent nuclear fuel.
In January, Washington sent a tentative olive branch Pyongyang's way -- distinguishing between negotiations and talks (saying it would engage in the latter) and putting in writing that it did not intend to invade North Korea. Pyongyang responded by withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and later attempting to force down a U.S. reconnaissance plane over international waters.
Then, when Washington offered multilateral talks, Pyongyang refused to allow the South, whose security is most threatened, to sit at the table, adding further insult by declaring the 1992 South-North Denuclearization Agreement to be nullified.
Meanwhile, every time North Korea inches closer to admitting it has nuclear weapons, it makes it harder for any responsible member of the international community to argue its case, especially when, almost daily, Pyongyang threatens war against someone: the United States, South Korea, Japan, or the international community in general.
Another Washington success, spurred on by a North Korean threat to export nuclear materials -- not to mention its reputation as a smuggler of drugs and other contraband -- was widespread support among 11 Asia-Pacific and European nations in Madrid last week for a U.S. "Proliferation Security Initiative" aimed at intercepting shipments of illegal weapons of mass destruction on the high seas.
This was followed by strong statements against WMD proliferation at this week's ASEAN Regional Forum in Cambodia. The assembled ministers (North Korea's foreign minister was conspicuously absent) urged North Korea to resume cooperation with the IAEA and rejoin the non-proliferation treaty, while expressing unanimous support for the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, even as North Korea threatened to "put further spurs to increasing its nuclear deterrent force" and warned of "limitless" retaliation against any who dared interfere.
Pyongyang just doesn't get it: Pursuing a nuclear weapons program is hazardous to its economic and political health. Amusingly, it argued last week that it needed nuclear weapons to save on the cost of maintaining a large conventional force. But the costs of coming out of the nuclear closet will be much greater than any savings, since South Korea, among others, has warned that going down that "blind alley" will bring an end to the economic cooperation that helps keep Pyongyang afloat.
Pyongyang's conventional-weapons threat has served as its best security blanket, since the human costs associated with a war exceeded those of tolerating this reprehensible regime. But adding nuclear weapons to the mix could change this calculus.
Ironically, the best way for Pyongyang to counter Washington's strategy would be to stop acting like itself and challenge the Bush administration to take "yes" for an answer. Agree to a nuclear freeze, invite the IAEA inspectors back in, rejoin the NPT, and then sit down in a multi- lateral setting and respectfully request the security guarantees and economic benefits that have been promised. Or it can continue helping Washington tighten the noose around its own neck.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.