The Rising East
Japan’s aversion
to nuclear weapons
stronger than everThree prominent Japanese politicians have recently mused out loud that maybe, perhaps, possibly Japan should consider, think about, or debate the acquisition of nuclear arms.
In a nation still infected with a nuclear allergy, the consequence of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that led to Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, even a whiff of suspicion that Japan might go nuclear causes national and international consternation.
The injudicious remarks by Yasuo Fukuda, the chief cabinet secretary, Shinzo Abe, a senior member of the ruling party, and opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa triggered calls for Fukuda's resignation, rallies in Hiroshima, and criticism from Russia, China and North Korea. Those nuclear powers were joined by South Korea.
In response, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi rushed to deny any change in Japan's anti-nuclear stance. An experienced observer in Tokyo, Peter Ennis of the Oriental Economist Report, asserted: "There is absolutely no evidence -- none whatsoever -- that the Liberal Democratic Party, the Japan Defense Agency, or the military branches are actively studying the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons. The LDP has no study group; the military has no task forces. No one is seriously looking at the issue."
U.S. officials with access to the best U.S. intelligence confirm that assessment.
Beyond the immediate dust-up, nuclear arms make no political, diplomatic, economic or, especially, military sense for Japan even though Tokyo has the funds and the technology to develop them. Despite the nuclear allergy, Japan has 52 nuclear power plants generating 36 percent of the country's electricity to lessen dependence on imported oil.
As a Japanese strategic thinker said some years ago: "Japan is N minus six months," meaning that Tokyo could detonate a nuclear explosion within six months of a decision to do so.
But the underlying opposition to nuclear arms in Japan itself is so deep-seated that it's doubtful any cabinet today could survive that decision. The ensuing eruption would be enormous and blood would run in the streets.
Moreover, the shock waves that would ripple out to the rest of Asia would be so strong that Japanese efforts to exert diplomatic influence would be set back a half century. In the United States, even the most hardened hawk would squirm in his chair and Japan's alliance with the United States would be severely strained, if not broken.
For Japan, with the world's second or third largest economy, to acquire nuclear weapons would gravely damage, and maybe destroy, the non-proliferation regime already badly hurt by the nuclear weapons newly developed by India and Pakistan. The Japanese, who ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1976, would not be applauded for that.
Finally, there is no military rationale for a Japanese nuclear force. Unlike Russia, China and the United States, Japan has no wide open spaces into which to sink missile silos away from cities. The same would be true for airfields on which bombers might be based. Japan would become what military planners call a "target-rich environment."
Japan's only hope of building a survivable nuclear force would be to put it in submarines. The example of France is illuminating. France is building a second generation of four ballistic missile submarines about two-thirds the size of a U.S. Ohio-class submarine, with two-thirds (16) the number of missiles. Two will be at sea at any one time while the others are refitting.
That program for submarines, missiles, shipyards and other support has been estimated to cost $12.8 billion at current exchange rates, with each submarine alone priced at $1.8 billion or about what the latest -- and much more capable -- U.S. submarine cost.
For that money, Japan could buy weapons and equipment that would be far more useful in strengthening the nation's military posture. Air transports, aerial tankers, warships, communications equipment and stockpiles of ammunition, fuel and spare parts are among the needs. Japan's force today ranks about 25th in the world and is ill-prepared for demanding military operations.
There is one caution: The Japanese will not feel the need for nuclear weapons so long as they are confident that the American nuclear umbrella is credible, that they can count on the United States to deter and, if necessary, repel aggression. Take that away and all bets are off. The key to Japan's nuclear future is therefore held in Washington, not Tokyo.
Richard Halloran is a former correspondent
for The New York Times in Asia and a former editorial
director of the Star-Bulletin. His column appears Sundays.
He can be reached by e-mail at rhalloran@starbulletin.com