The Rising East
Sino-American relations hit the skids again last week when the Chinese refused to allow a U.S. warship to make a port call in Hong Kong, a sign of Beijing's anger over the visit to the United States of a Taiwanese defense minister and the inclusion of China on a U.S. nuclear target list. Strategic ambiguity in
U.S. China policy gives way
to not quite strategic clarityDuring the last three months, it has become apparent that the lines between the United States and China have hardened and, consequently, the long-standing American posture of "strategic ambiguity" in China policy is fading.
That ambiguity has not yet been replaced by "strategic clarity," but President Bush seems to be moving that way, either deliberately or inadvertently. That is particularly evident in the most sensitive issue between them, the fate of the island of Taiwan. Beijing says it is part of China; Washington says that has yet to be determined.
The standoff over Taiwan is entangled in diplomatic verbiage. The Chinese seek to make their case by repeatedly pointing to the "Three Communiqués" between Washington and Beijing, while Bush contends that the Taiwan Relations Act and the "Six Assurances" are decisive.
The root of the dispute lies in the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 that re-established contact between America and China after 25 years of animosity, which included nearly three years of fighting in the Korean War.
In that communiqué, the United States "acknowledges" the Chinese claim that "Taiwan is part of China" and "reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question."
Henry Kissinger, then national security adviser to President Nixon and U.S. negotiator of the communiqué, wrote later that this "ambiguous formula" was intended "to put off the issue of Taiwan to the future." Subsequent communiqués issued under President Carter in 1979 and President Reagan in 1982 have repeated the ambiguous formula.
The Chinese have tried to spin the communiqués to support their ambitions. They contend that the United States has acknowledged that Taiwan is part of China. No U.S. administration has said any such thing.
The Chinese ignore a stipulation that settling the dispute over Taiwan must be peaceful. Kissinger wrote that Nixon "left no doubt that he would insist on a peaceful resolution" even before the Shanghai Communiqué was completed.
Every president since has reiterated that, but the Chinese say they retain the right to use force.
Some Chinese argue that the communiqués have the same force as a treaty, which they don't, either legally or politically. In the United States, a treaty must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate; none of the communiqués has been submitted to the Senate.
On the other side, Bush has emphasized the Taiwan Relations Act, or TRA, more forcefully than his predecessors. That law, which takes precedence over the three communiqués, was overwhelmingly enacted by an angry Congress after Carter switched U.S. diplomatic ties to Beijing from Taipei in 1979.
The TRA says the United States would view with "grave concern" an attempt by China to take Taiwan by military force. Bush has carried that a step further by saying the U.S. would do whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself.
The "Six Assurances" were requested of Reagan by the Taiwanese in 1982, and he privately agreed. They commit the United States to continue arms sales to Taiwan, to avoid getting Beijing's permission for those sales, and not to mediate between Taiwan and China. In addition, the United States pledges to uphold the TRA, to assert that the sovereignty over Taiwan is undecided, and not to press Taiwan to negotiate with China.
Shortly after Reagan agreed, a senior State Department official briefed the Congress about the assurances. For the next 20 years, Washington was mostly silent about them. Now they have been given new life by the Bush administration.
A new element in this equation was introduced by the Clinton administration and continued by Bush, which is that any agreement on the fate of Taiwan must have the agreement of the people there. In a conflict, this self-determination may draw support from around the world.
The danger in this emerging equation is that Beijing will become frustrated because it is not seeing what Chinese would consider progress on resolving the issue. What they might try to do about it is anyone's guess.
Richard Halloran is a former correspondent
for The New York Times in Asia and a former editorial
director of the Star-Bulletin. His column appears Sundays.
He can be reached by e-mail at rhalloran@starbulletin.com