The Rising East

BY RICHARD HALLORAN

Sunday, October 28, 2001

How and when
U.S. forces will exit
Afghanistan remains
a question

America has found it easy to get into war but harder to get out after the well-defined days of unconditional surrender that brought World War II to a close in 1945. There was no ambiguity in the crushing defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan.

Since then, however, the Korean War of 1950-53 ended in stalemate after two years of negotiations and U.S. forces are still there today. The Vietnam conflict of 1954-1973 was fought on the shifting sands of ever changing objectives and strategies, winding down into an American withdrawal. The Gulf War of 1991 had a clear objective, getting Iraq out of Kuwait, but left Saddam Hussein in power in Baghdad. U.S. warplanes still patrol Iraqi skies.

Now comes Afghanistan, a consequence of the terrorist assaults of September 11. Despite the tyranny of distance, the United States began an aerial invasion of Afghanistan less than four weeks after the attack and has inserted unknown numbers of Rangers and other ground troops into that remote land.

Question: What constitutes victory or a satisfactory ending and how does the United States get out?

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld tried to answer the question last week in a meeting with editors of USA Today, but couldn't. It wasn't for the lack of trying or because he was dissembling. A transcript of the meeting put out by the Pentagon shows that he genuinely doesn't know. "How," he asked rhetorically, "can anyone know what the outcome is going to be until you get there?"

Rumsfeld was clear on objectives: "The president's purpose in this effort is to root out terrorists and terrorist networks and to stop terrorists and people harboring terrorists." In addition to Afghanistan, he said, "you have to deal with the 50 other cells around the world -- drying up their money, arresting people, interrogating people, gathering intelligence, doing some overt military activities as well as some covert military activities."

Pressing the point, an editor asked whether the United States needed to get Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of the al-Qaida terrorist band, for the operation to be considered successful. "My attitude is if he were gone tomorrow, the same problem would exist," Rumsfeld said. "He's got a whole bunch of lieutenants that have been trained and they've got bank accounts all over."

So killing or capturing bin Laden would not be the final measure of success. Even if the United States did a terrific job of finding and eliminating the known terrorists of today, Rumsfeld indicated, even that would not be the end of it. "Are we ever going to be able to stop people from wanting to terrorize each other?" he asked in another rhetorical question. "No, I suspect not."

President Bush, Secretary Rumsfled and Secretary of State Colin Powell have skillfully nurtured the public support that has billowed up across the nation since September 11. The president and his associates, however, will most likely need to articulate what is known in Washington as an end game or exit strategy if they are to keep that vital backing.

Perhaps Powell should dust off a concept that he had a strong hand in writing for former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who served in the administration of President Reagan; then-Maj. Gen. Powell was Weinberger's military assistant. In 1984, amid much post-Vietnam debate about the application of military force as an instrument of national policy, Weinberger enunciated six principles in what some people today call the Weinberger Doctrine.

Those principles would have some value in deciding an exit strategy, but it would be limited. The first three are applicable to Afghanistan: The U.S. commits forces only to defend a vital national interest, the intention must be to win and the political and military objectives should be clearly defined. That a way out should be calculated can be inferred from those three points.

The other three principles, which have common sense applications to Afghanistan, are a continual adjustment of forces to the mission, reasonable assurance of public support and "the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort."

For now, Americans seeking a way to gauge victory, to discern an end game, to discover an exit strategy must be content with the sorrowful tones of an uncertain trumpet, because no one seems to know.

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Richard Halloran is editorial director of the Star-Bulletin.
He can be reached by e-mail at rhalloran@starbulletin.com