Sunday, August 26, 2001
Delicate naval Speculation rippled through the sea lanes of East Asia last week as the U.S. Navy steamed two aircraft carriers into the South China Sea to put on an unusually public display of sea and air power, with details and pictures prominently posted on Navy web sites. The exercise was seen as a caution to China, which forced a U.S. intelligence plane to make an emergency landing on Chinese soil after a collision with a Chinese fighter over the South China Sea in April.
power maneuvering
plays out in
South China Sea
U.S. Navy keeps the peace as
China vies for hegemony
over Taiwan StraitBy Joseph Morgan
Special to the Star-BulletinNavy spokesmen denied that the drill was anything more than that. Then, as if to underscore the denial, the Navy blithely sailed a flotilla of warships into Hong Kong harbor where the crews were sent ashore for shopping, sightseeing, and other recreation. The question of warning China was left hanging.
The naval drill reopened another pair of questions: If China launched an amphibious assault on the island of Taiwan, which Beijing claims to be a province separated from China, would the United States send naval forces to assist the Taiwanese in defending themselves, as implied in the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979? Equally pertinent, would that help be necessary?
At present, many analysts discount the ability of China to mount an assault on Taiwan; its amphibious ships are too small, and Taiwan's air force could control the airspace over the 120-mile-wide Taiwan Strait. Even so, China has conducted military exercises with a focus on the strait.
An objective was to practice "attacking and fighting off an aircraft carrier," according to Chinese military documents. Since Taiwan has no carriers, that pronouncement appears to refer to the U.S. Navy, which has previously sent carriers to the waters adjacent to Taiwan to demonstrate its concern for the security of Taipei against Beijing.
The Chinese and Taiwanese navies that would be engaged in a conflict have different missions and therefore different ships and organizations. Taiwan's navy is configured to protect the island against attack and to keep the sea lanes open. Coastal defense is essential; a navy that could project power is not.
Hence Taiwan's navy features a small number of diesel powered submarines and a reasonably large number of des- troyers, frigates, corvettes, and fast-attack craft, all with limited ranges. Since the only potential enemy is China's navy, changes in Taiwan's navy mean increasing the numbers of destroyers and submarines and enhancing their effectiveness.
The Taiwan Relations Act requires Washington to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons and equipment. As the Chinese navy, known as the Peoples Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, has improved its capability, Taiwan has asked the U.S. to sell it the latest in destroyers to replace the current destroyer force, which is now more than 40 years old. Replacing Taiwan's destroyers with ships of the Arleigh Burke class has been rejected by the Bush administration but an offer has been made to sell ships of the Isaac Kidd class, of an older but still effective design.
Likewise, the administration has approved the sale of modern submarines powered with diesel-electric engines. Since the U.S. no longer makes such submarines, they could only come from European countries that have developed improved conventional submarines. Beijing, however, has made clear that it would take drastic, if unspecified, action against any nation that furnished the submarines to Taiwan.
The mission and structure of PLAN is much more complicated. Since 1949 the mainland navy has been configured for coastal defense. Originally, the idea was that the ships were part of the Army, with a general was in command. Even now, PLAN has hundreds of small, fast-attack craft; those with guided missiles are quite effective, but their small size severely limits their range and they have little power-projection capability.
China has a sizeable number of diesel-powered patrol submarines. China has also built five nuclear-powered attack submarines and a single nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine. The state of repair and the operability of these boats is questionable.
Until recently, PLAN's destroyers had guns rather than missiles and the range of the ships was limited. Now PLAN has several modern destroyers obtained from Russia that are capable of firing missiles and have greater operating ranges. The fleet has no cruisers needed to project power and probably no operational nuclear submarines.
That may be changing as China is seeking to acquire a fleet capable of achieving limited power projection over smaller geographic regions. PLAN can extend its reach into the South China Sea, where it claims the Paracel and Spratley Islands. It aspires to control the East China and Yellow Seas and even to reach into the Indian Ocean -- but all of that seems to be a ways off.
Joseph Morgan, a retired U.S. naval officer,
teaches geography at the University of Hawaii.