No criminal An investigation into the 25th Infantry Division's first Black Hawk helicopter crash six months ago, which claimed the lives of six soldiers, has concluded that there was no evidence of criminal negligence on the part of the pilots.
neglect in crash
The Army concludes safety
issues led to a helicopter accidentBy Gregg K. Kakesako
gkakesako@starbulletin.comHowever, Major General James Dubik, division commander, said Lt. Col. Paul Disney, former commander of the division's aviation battalion, "failed to fully comply with standard procedures -- procedures designed to maximize safety when we conduct training."
Disney, who left the islands to attend the U.S. Army War College, was given "a general officer letter of reprimand, for inadequate planning, incomplete risk assessment and failure to rehearse an alternate route."
Dubik said the letter of reprimand was sent to Disney, who has the option of replying to Dubik's charges before the division commander decides whether to make it part of his official record, which could affect his next promotion or assignment.
"That was the most severe punishment available to me," said Dubik, "because there was no evidence of criminal negligence."
The two-star general said the accident was "extremely tragic" because it was the first one involving Black Hawks, which the Tropic Lightning Division received in February 1985, and "because we wanted to do the right thing for everyone involved."
The six-month-long Army investigation also determined that pilots Chief Warrant Officers Greg Montgomery and George Perry failed to keep an adequate separation from the first Black Hawk in the formation as the flight was attempting a landing.However, some of the families of the six crash victims aren't happy with the Army's final decision.
Ann MacDonald, whose husband Specialist Bob MacDonald, was killed Feb. 12 in the night Kahuku training exercise attended yesterday's nearly hour-long news conference on the crash, She asked Dubik what was being done so "another wife doesn't have to suffer what I suffered."
Dubik told her that the findings of the investigation has been sent to the Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker in Alabama so they can be made available to the entire Army.
"I paid the ultimate price for this risk assessment," Mrs. MacDonald told Dubik, who then asked to talk privately with her in his office.
Brigadier General Bill Caldwell, assistant division commander in charge of operations, said besides Disney's failure to conduct adequate planning, a complete risk assessment and rehearse an alternate route, other factors led to the crash:
>> Intermittent heavy rain showers.
>> Winds.
>> A tight 180-degree turn into the landing zone in the Kahuku Training area across from Sunset Beach.
>> A heavy load, which was a 7,500-pound Humvee, carried by one of the Black Hawks.
The mission on Feb. 12 was to pick up soldiers and equipment from Schofield Barracks' East Range and fly them to a site in the Kahuku Training Area 15 miles away. The aircraft were arranged in groups of four, flying in a staggered formation.
The accident involved the third group of the mission at around 7:40 p.m. All of the Black Hawks in the third group were carrying sling loads. The first three Black Hawks were carrying relatively light loads of ammunition crates in cargo netting. The fourth aircraft, piloted by Chief Warrant Officers Montgomery and Perry, carried the heavier Humvee.
Caldwell explained that two routes had been planned for the Feb. 12 mission. When the forecast for the primary route over the Kahuku mountain range dropped below the acceptable minimum standards of 1,000 foot ceiling and three mile visibility, Col. Andrew Twomey, the air assault task force commander, chose the alternate and safer ocean route along the Haleiwa coastline. However, that also meant a riskier 180-degree turn into the landing zone.
Caldwell said the first group of four Black Hawks reported that the conditions were acceptable as it left the landing zone. However, the leader of the second group reported that although the flight approach was "doable," he had concerns about the wind conditions and recommended a change in the landing direction.
As Twomey was waiting for an updated weather report, the group involving Perry and Montgomery's Black Hawk was already on its approach to land.Caldwell also noted that normally it is the lead helicopter which carries the heaviest load, allowing it to set the pace. On the night of the accident, Montgomery and Perry's Black Hawk swung the heaviest load, the Humvee, as part of the ground tactical plan, again a normally acceptable practice.
As the group approached the Kahuku landing zone, Montgomery and Perry's Black Hawk fell behind and out of position. They then radioed "heavy metal," which meant that they wanted the group to slow down so they could get back into position.
As the flight made the 180-degree turn into the landing zone, it slowed down and decreased altitude. Perry and Montgomery's Black Hawk was able to catch up to the other three aircraft and told the third helicopter in the formation to "speed up."
Perry and Montgomery's Black Hawk then left the formation and flew along the right side of the third and second helicopters in the flight.
At that point one of the four sling ropes of Perry and Montgomery's Black Hawk was severed by the rotor blade of the lead helicopter piloted by Chief Warrant Officers Paul King and Thomas Foose.
King and Foose's Black Hawk was forced to land, coming down hard on its belly in an upright position. All of its 11 occupants survived the crash.
Perry and Montgomery's Black Hawk turned over in mid-air and crashed into a gulch 80 to 100 yards west of the other downed helicopter. All six soldiers on board were killed.
Caldwell said "there is no simple answer to explain why" Perry and Montgomery failed to keep the required 180 to 300 feet separation from other aircraft.
"The crew of both aircraft were well-trained, seasoned professionals who had demonstrated time and time again they could overcome just about any challenge placed before them," Caldwell said.
Caldwell said procedural changes involving the use of heavy sling loads, risk assessments and landing zone operations have been made because of the Feb. 12 accident.