The Rising East
AS PRESIDENT BUSH heads into his second 100 days in office, his most pressing need in foreign policy is a comprehensive plan for meeting the challenges being thrust upon America today by Asia. Call it, if you will, a Bush Doctrine. China’s increasing
prominence demands
new clarity in
U.S.-Sino relationsThe United States is involved in confrontations with China and between China and Taiwan, between North Korea and South Korea, between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. Asian allies and friends wonder if they can count on the United States to fulfill its security commitments.
The United States runs an enormous trade deficit of $165 billion with China and Japan, plus other deficits with almost every Asian country because of their protectionism. The United States must ensure freedom of navigation on the ocean and over international waters. Pressures increase by the day to reduce U.S. military forces in Asia. In sum, America's challenges in Asia won't quit.
Bush has gotten off to a rocky start in Asia, as was pointed out in an article from The New York Times on these pages last week. To prevent more incidents and, on an affirmative note, to serve the nation well in Asia, the president might consider a doctrine of five fundamental elements:
Strategic clarity: A Bush Doctrine would start with a clear definition of U.S. interests in Asia, which would be directed at several disparate audiences. Foremost would be the American people and Congress. If Americans are to embrace a policy, they need to know what they are being asked to support with their votes and taxes. Most especially, if they are asked to send their sons and daughters in harm's way in Asia, they need to know why.
Strategic clarity would also be intended to reassure friends and allies that Americans know what they are doing and that the U.S. will keep its word.
Lastly, clarity would advise potential adversaries on what ground the United States will take a stand and would serve as a caution that the U.S. will defend its interests in Asia.
Tactical ambiguity: This would give notice that America will respond to danger in a time and manner and place of its own choosing. How the president would meet a threat in Asia would not be telegraphed ahead nor would he signal whether the instruments of response would be political, economic, or military -- or in cyberspace. The FBI has warned that Chinese hackers might try to disrupt American communications and computers. Two can play that game.
Realistic reciprocity: Americans have been engaged in a running debate, particularly about China, over containment and engagement. Realistic reciprocity, clumsy term that it is, would slip between containment that could turn into belligerence and engagement that could become appeasement. As the United States has opened its markets to imports from Asia, so Americans should expect Asians to reciprocate. As the United States does not seek to dominate Asia, so no other nation should.
Firm deterrence: At rock bottom, all security depends upon military forces properly armed, trained and deployed. Americans concerned with security issues today have been arguing over the nature (ground or sea or air) of U.S. forces in Asia, but most agree that some form of U.S. military power in Asia is necessary to deter war.
Genuine consultation: During the Cold War, and even more so afterward, American administrations often decided on a course of action without persuading friends to go along or to ask for their advice. An exception was the coalition assembled by President Bush the Elder for Desert Storm around the Persian Gulf. Another was the round of negotiations conducted by former Secretary of Defense William Perry to forge a tripartite agreement with Japan and South Korea on dealing with North Korea. President Bush the Younger might want to follow their examples.
Of these elements, strategic clarity might be the most controversial because it would be a distinct departure from the strategic ambiguity adopted by presidents from Nixon through Clinton. Strategic ambiguity may have served its purpose when China was a minor power. Over the last quarter-century, however, China has emerged as a major power seeking its place in the sun.
Unhappily, the Chinese sometimes flex their muscles at others, including the United States, and may be in danger of miscalculating. American strategic ambiguity cannot prevent that miscalculation but strategic clarity could, to everyone's benefit as history has shown that miscalculation is the most frequent cause of war.
Richard Halloran is editorial director of the Star-Bulletin.
He can be reached by e-mail at rhalloran@starbulletin.com