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Other crewmen As the special panel investigating the sinking of a Japanese ship by a U.S. submarine completes its first week of testimony, the question is whether the inquiry should expand to include more than just three USS Greeneville officers.
may face scrutiny
A vice admiral asks if the
fire-control technician and three
sonar crewmen should
also be questionedBy Gregg K. Kakesako
Star-Bulletin
During yesterday's Pearl Harbor court session, Vice Adm. John Nathman, president of the panel, asked Capt. Thomas Kyle, the Pacific Fleet Submarine Force's training officer, if other Greeneville crewmen should be "scrutinized."
So far, only Cmdr. Scott Waddle, the Greeneville's skipper; Lt. Cmdr. Gerald Pfeifer, the sub's executive officer; and Lt. j.g. Michael Coen have been named as parties to this rare Navy investigative board.
But Nathman questioned whether the actions of a fire-control technician, Petty Officer Perry Seacrest, and three members of Greeneville's sonar crew should be included.
Seacrest had information that the Ehime Maru was within 4,000 yards and closing but never informed any of the sub's senior officers. He also said he was hindered from maintaining a paper chart in the control room for at least an hour because the 16 civilian guests on the starboard side of the submarine were in his way.
Kyle also disclosed yesterday that there was a fourth qualified Greeneville sonar man who was in the sonar shack and helped with the sonar analysis, but misread the sonar contact that later turned out to be the Ehime Maru.
"This person came in to pick up his jacket and stood behind the trainee and then became engaged with the problem," Kyle said.
Earlier this week, a Navy investigative officer testified that only three people were in the sonar shack -- a qualified sonar man, a trainee (Seaman Stewart Rhodes) and a supervisor -- before the accident occurred, an apparent violation of Navy procedure.
Violation of Navy policy
The sonar supervisor also wasn't always working in the sonar room, because he had the additional duty of escorting the 16 civilians visiting the Greeneville.Kyle said this fourth sonar man -- Chief Petty Officer Roberto Reyes -- didn't realize until the National Transportation Safety Board investigation that the sonar contact he was working on was the Ehime Maru.
"He broke down and felt bad that he missed the contact, Kyle said.
Kyle, who also is the Pacific Fleet's Submarine Force chief of staff, said he recently found out from a member of his staff, who conducts inspections, that about 20 percent of the Pacific Fleet's submarines allow trainees to work at sonar consoles without constant supervision -- a violation of Navy policy.
Submarine procedure requires that a sonar trainee can only be at a work station as long as he is being constantly supervised.
He also reiterated testimony that the collision could have been avoided had the Greeneville's crew spent more time analyzing the sonar data it received.
Kyle used sonar data and other information to reconstruct the events leading up to collision at 1:43 p.m. Feb. 9, nine miles south of Diamond Head.
Before going to periscope depth, the Greeneville ascended to 150 feet and was traveling north when it obtained a sonar contact, described as Sierra 13. But Kyle said Greeneville only held that course for 35 seconds.
Had the Greeneville maintained that course for at least three minutes -- which is generally the time needed to get an accurate reading -- it would have been able to determine that "the contact (Sierra 13) was within a mile or so."
"It would have been obvious to all on the ship the contact was that close," said Kyle when asked what would have happened had the Greeneville followed procedure. Sierra 13 turned out to be the Ehime Maru.
Kyle said Seacrest's job is vital since the sonar crew only collects course, speed and range of a sonar contact.
It's the fire-control technician who then plots the position of the contacts in relationship to the Greeneville.
The fire-control technician's job is "to try to establish safe envelopes around the ship," Kyle said.
Ship 4,000 yards from sub
Minutes before the collision, at 1:34 p.m., Seacrest was trying to determine the location of another contact, Sierra 14.Three minutes later, Seacrest apparently updated the position of Ehime Maru (Sierra 13) at 4,000 yards, but failed to inform Waddle or Pfeifer.
Greeneville at that point was at 150 feet, rising to periscope depth of 60 feet to check the surface before performing an emergency main ballast blow.
Video simulations shown
Kyle also presented two color videos, which showed computer simulations of what Waddle and Coen may have seen from the periscope of the Greeneville during the three sweeps of the horizon, which lasted only 80 seconds instead of the normal practice of three minutes.The video showed how easily Waddle and Coen could have missed the Ehime Maru in choppy seas and a hazy sky. It was virtually impossible to recognize anything.
Even Kyle had to acknowledge he was unable to see anything during the recreated periscope sweeps.
In contrast, Kyle presented a third video that took longer -- the proscribed three minutes -- and the simulated vessel was easily recognized.
But Nathman warned the court not to make any conclusions because of the video.
Kyle noted that one of the reasons the Greeneville didn't return to Pearl Harbor that day as scheduled and spent the night off Waikiki was because there was "mild hysteria" among some of the 16 civilian guests and transferring them to another boat at night for transit back to Oahu would have been dangerous.
The high school fisheries training vessel now sits on the bottom of the ocean at 2,003 feet. The Navy on Monday will announce whether it will raise the 499-ton vessel.
Family members of the nine missing crewmen, students and teachers believe they may be entombed in the ship.