U.S. can reduce nuclear threat
by reducing its own arsenal
RECENT international events and upcoming
U.S. elections provide
an opportunity for
progress on reducing the
threat posed by nuclear
weapons. The importance, and
urgency, is illustrated by the
current crises involving nuclear
programs in North Korea
and Iran and instability in Pakistan
and the Middle East. U.S.
nuclear policy is crucial to further
progress and needs careful
examination. Two different
approaches have been advocated.
Action by citizens is
necessary to stimulate formulation
of a U.S. policy that
helps reduce the nuclear
threat.
The approach I support emphasizes
international actions
leading toward nuclear disarmament.
This might seem like a
utopian goal, but the 1970 Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty
obliges the United States and
other nuclear-weapon states to
“pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear
arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament.”
Specific actions supporting this
approach have been advocated
for some time but were given
added emphasis in the Jan. 4,
2007, Wall Street Journal commentary
by former Secretaries
of State George Schultz and
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary
of Defense William Perry
and former Sen. Sam Nunn. In
April the Union of Concerned
Scientists released a statement
by 95 prominent scientists recommending
several practical
steps supporting this approach.
THE OTHER approach hopes
to deter major attacks on the
United States by maintaining
nuclear attack capability. It is
illustrated by a July 2007 statement
by the current secretaries
of energy, defense and
state. This statement contends
that the United States needs a
reliable replacement warhead
(RRW) to replace aging warheads
in the current arsenal
and suggests that the United
States might need to resume
nuclear testing to certify existing
weapons if the RRW is not
approved by Congress. This
and other U.S. statements, notably
the 2002 Nuclear Posture
Review, imply that the United
States intends to maintain a
sizable nuclear arsenal indefinitely.
Some reduction in nuclear
arsenals is consistent with either
approach. The 2002
Moscow Treaty will reduce deployed
U.S. and Russian strategic
weapons to 2,200 by the
end of 2012. However, this
treaty does not require that
the undeployed weapons be
dismantled, so several thousand
could be kept in storage
and there are no negotiations
to address this issue or further
reductions. Furthermore, the
Moscow Treaty relies on provisions
in the 1991 START
Treaty, which expires in 2009.
Therefore, it is unclear
whether there will be further
reductions.
The more serious danger is
that the nonproliferation
regime based on the nonproliferation
treaty will unravel. It is
already under stress because
the three countries that have
not signed it (Israel, India
and Pakistan) have nuclear
weapons, and four countries
(Iraq, North Korea, Iran and
Libya) violated their treaty
commitments and had secret
nuclear programs. If the United
States continues to maintain
that it needs nuclear weapons,
it is unlikely other countries
will give up theirs. Regrettably,
the 2005 treaty review conference
ended without any substantive
agreements.
ANY APPROACH dealing
with the threat posed by thousands
of nuclear weapons has
risks and uncertainties. Because
risks of nuclear proliferation
and terrorist use are
greater when there are large
numbers of nuclear weapons, I
believe there is less risk for the
United States and the world in
moving toward nuclear disarmament
than in maintaining
U.S. weapons and hoping other
countries won’t develop or use
them.
There are a number of actions
that the United States
should take. The Senate should
ratify the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty, which it rejected in
1999. The START and Moscow
treaties should be extended
and negotiations for further reductions
in U.S. and Russian
arsenals should start immediately.
The United States should
examine reducing its arsenal
to a few hundred nuclear
weapons, as recommended in a
National Academy of Sciences
study of U.S. policy in 1997.
There are also actions that
the United States should not
take. Congress should not fund
new nuclear weapons such as
earth-penetrating weapons or
the RRW. It should not fund development
or testing of antisatellite
weapons, whether
ground- or space-based. Antisatellite
weapons are not nuclear
weapons but would
undermine stability by threatening
satellites that provide
warning of missile launches
and other military activities.
WHAT CAN citizens do?
They can learn about efforts to
reduce the nuclear threat from
organizations such as the
Union of Concerned Scientists.
They can ask their members of
Congress to support further reductions
in the U.S. nuclear
arsenal and to oppose development
of new nuclear weapons
and anti-satellite weapons.
Hawaii residents could ask
Sen. Daniel Inouye about a recent
statement suggesting that
Congress consider allowing deployment
of space weapons.
Citizen involvement is
needed because international
efforts toward nuclear disarmament
are stalled in part by
lack of U.S. commitment and
leadership. Action by citizens
worldwide helped to achieve
the existing treaties banning
nuclear tests and limiting proliferation.
U.S. political leaders
and presidential candidates
need encouragement from citizens
to take the actions necessary
to eliminate the nuclear
threat.
Michael Jones is a physicist at the University of Hawaii-Manoa. The opinions expressed in this column are his own.
CORRECTION Thursday, June 5, 2008
U.S. Sen. Daniel K. Inouye has consistently opposed having weapons in space. In a May 4 commentary, University of Hawaii physicist Michael Jones wrote, "Hawaii residents could ask Sen. Daniel Inouye about a recent statement suggesting that Congress consider allowing deployment of space weapons." The statement apparently alluded to a March 11 report in the online publication CongressNow, in which Sens. Inouye and Bill Nelson of Florida were misquoted.
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