Success of war must be examined
WE'VE BEEN hearing relentlessly during the past few months that the Iraq war is not successful. But have we paused to define what constitutes success? Have we paused to determine whether our objectives have been met? Are we sure we are not changing our definition of success as time goes along, forgetting why we went into Iraq in the first place? Let's take a look at these questions and analyze what's really going on.
Let's not forget that we went into Iraq to topple Saddam to wipe off a cancer from the face of the Earth, ensure that there were no weapons of mass destruction, eliminate refuge for terrorists, clamp Iraqi support for terrorists in Palestine and ensure that oil is not used as a weapon by a mad dictator. There is no doubt that all these were accomplished. Nowhere in our mission statement was it anywhere mentioned that we were going into Iraq to quell sectarian hatred that had been simmering for a thousand years.
The United States succeeded in exposing and thwarting numerous plans of the terrorists to attack it. What you didn't get by way of another terrorist attack in the United States was a success of the Iraqi, Afghan and other covert international operations. Think about what could have happened if you had turned your cheek. To think that the war is not a crusade is also naive because the determination and doggedness of the misguided Muslim terrorists gunning for the United States is close to madness. Burying our head in the sand and thinking they won't come after us on our soil is too naive, too unreal. Moreover, the evidence existed after the Afghan operation started in October 2001 that terrorist elements were planning attacks on U.S. soil.
The 2003 exposure of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan's nuclear proliferation network irrefutably disclosed that Pakistan supplied uranium enrichment technology to Iraq as far back as 1990. By 1991, Iraq was building a facility for a centrifuge. Also recall that the Iraq war convinced Libya's Moammar Gadhafi to come clean on WMDs, a fantastic intelligence and diplomatic success by all counts. (Of course, Pakistan also supplied centrifuge cascade to North Korea and Iran, which is why we now have the problem with those two countries, as well).
There is also a very high likelihood that Khan sold cascades to al-Qaida, which is known to have tried in 1994 and 1995 through Sudanese individuals to acquire nuclear material. Going into Iraq and Afghanistan places the United States in a better position to intercept terrorist and nuclear traffic in the Mideast that might be eventually directed against it.
Former U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blitz singularly led the world astray in his tirade against the United States. He had reports in the early 1990s that Pakistan supplied centrifuge cascades to Iraq, and yet refused ever to acknowledge that because he couldn't find them. Try hunting for a needle in a haystack, since chemical weapons and centrifuge cascades can be operated behind chicken sheds and dairy farms, and enriched uranium can be hidden in cow sheds behind heaps of cow dung, not to mention that cascades, drawings and uranium can be taken across to neighboring countries.
The Iraq war influenced Syria to pull out of Lebanon, another success milestone. That sectarian violence erupted in Iraq does not mean that the U.S. mission in Iraq is not successful. We did not go into Iraq to bring peace to them, but to bring peace to us. Let all know this truth -- that those who mess with a hornet's nest must face the consequences. Every nation has an inalienable right to live in peace. The United States is no exception.
Finally, those who believe the purpose of the Iraq war is to halt the sectarian violence are not looking beyond their noses, not to mention that they are shifting from initial objectives. The United States is responsible for itself, not for others. The United States can't and needn't stop that violence. What the United States is doing in Iraq is clearly designed at self-preservation and the future security of the world. Leaving a vacuum there might well encourage rogue powers to gain dominance in the Middle East, and that would make the calculus much too complicated for comfort.
Amarjit Singh is an associate professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering at the University of Hawaii-Manoa.