Shaken, but not stirred to accord on N. Korea
THE SECOND session of the fifth round of Six-Party Talks, held Dec. 18-22 in Beijing, ended much the same as the first session had some 13 months earlier, with a vague promise to implement the September 2005 denuclearization agreement "as soon as possible," but with absolutely no progress toward that goal. Like November 2005, the participants could not even agree on a date for the next session, promising only to "reconvene at the earliest possibility."
Prior to the talks, North Korea had stated clearly, and on numerous occasions, that it had agreed to return to the dialog "on the premise that the issue of lifting sanctions should be discussed and resolved." The topic was indeed discussed, but certainly not resolved. What Washington approached as a negotiating point, Pyongyang stuck to as a prerequisite, assuring that no progress would be made unless the Bush administration somehow set U.S. law aside and removed its restrictions over allegations of North Korean money laundering and counterfeiting operations against Macao's Banco Delta Asia (BDA).
The chief U.S. negotiator at the talks, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, made it clear that from a U.S. perspective, the nuclear and sanctions issues should not be linked. At the end of the day, however, Hill acknowledged that North Korean negotiator Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan, apparently had "strict instructions" not to discuss nuclear developments until the sanctions issue was resolved.
ASSOCIATED PRESS
Top envoys representing their respective countries joined hands before a dinner together Dec. 17 at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse in Beijing, on the eve of the resumption of the Six-Party Talks aimed at dismantling North Korea's nuclear program. From left: South Korea's Chung Yung-woo; Japan's Kenichiro Sasae; the United States' Christopher Hill; China's Wu Dawei; North Korea's Kim Kye Gwan; and Russia's Sergey Razov.
|
|
The United States has argued, so far unpersuasively, that the pot of gold at the end of the cooperation rainbow would far exceed the $24 million in assets frozen as a result of the BDA action. This might be true, but totally misses the point. From Pyongyang's perspective, it is not just about the money (although the BDA investigation has curtailed Pyongyang's access to the international financial system as other banks have cut their own ties with North Korea out of fear of similar investigative action).
The sanctions are proof in Pyongyang's eyes of the Bush administration's "hostile policy" toward North Korea. It is this policy, and not just the banking sanctions, that must be demonstrably changed before Pyongyang would even consider giving up its nuclear weapons. In other words, even if the BDA issue is successfully resolved -- through the lifting of U.S. restrictions or a finding that only selected accounts were suspect and restrictions against the others were withdrawn -- this would not guarantee progress toward the denuclearization goal.
Previously, Pyongyang also insisted that delivery of two light-water nuclear reactors promised under the now defunct 1994 Agreed Framework, was another prerequisite; North Korea's interpretation of the September 2005 Joint Statement reinforces this point. Pyongyang has also branded the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative -- aimed at preventing the illegal movement of weapons of mass destruction -- as another clear example of Washington's hostile intent. For that matter, U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718, issued after North Korea's missile launches and nuclear test earlier this year, have also been condemned as "a product of the U.S. hostile policy toward North Korea; Pyongyang has demanded that these too be rescinded.
It is not clear from Pyongyang's declarations whether all these additional "proofs" of non-hostile attitude must be fully implemented before it will begin serious denuclearization discussions. However, North Korea has clearly signaled that it has no intention of giving up its nuclear weapons until the United States has demonstrated, by the above-mentioned actions and more, that it has fully abandoned its hostile policy.
Washington's promised pot of gold also is an unattractive option because it comes with very heavy strings attached. In order to get, Pyongyang must give; it must give up its only ace in the hole and the only reason it is taken seriously today: its nuclear weapons programs. While this might appear a reasonable quid pro quo to Washington, it is too high a price to pay from Pyongyang's vantage point -- at least as long as it can still get from others without giving.
Despite its missile and nuclear tests and U.N.-mandated sanctions, Pyongyang is still getting an abundant amount of aid and development assistance from Seoul, primarily via the Kumgang tourist project and the Kaesong economic development zone, and from Beijing, through its economic investments throughout the North Korea. Notwithstanding its official policy to "not tolerate" a nuclear weapons-equipped North, South Korea's assistance to its northern brothers reached record levels in 2006 and is scheduled to grow even larger in 2007. While China's figures are harder to come by, its investments and aid will likely also grow, as Beijing incredulously argues that "punishment isn't the goal" of the U.N. sanctions.
Why then should we assume or even hope that another round of Six-Party Talks, if one occurs, will be any more fruitful than the last two? While North Korea would no doubt welcome another pot of gold, it is doing very well with the pots being provided by Seoul and Beijing, without any visible strings attached.
Until and unless Seoul and Beijing are prepared to increase the cost of non-cooperation, the best we can hope for, even if another round of talks occurs, is continued North Korean stalling and diversionary tactics and increased frustration in Washington. The Bush administration is right when it says that China and South Korea share its denuclearization goal. Until they have crafted a common approach toward achieving that goal, however, North Korea is unlikely to cooperate.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute, and senior editor of Comparative Connections.