[ ASIAN OUTLOOK ]Progress in U.S.- N.Korea
nuclear arms talks
hinges on next steps
Some good, some bad, some ugly! That was the way a senior Bush administration official summed up the just-completed third plenary session of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing, aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. While it was clear that Pyongyang and Washington had come to the meeting with a more cooperative attitude, the two sides "remained far from an agreement." No breakthroughs had been anticipated and none occurred.
Given past meetings, however, when the most that could be agreed upon was to meet again, it is encouraging that both Washington and Pyongyang made serious proposals, more clearly defining their respective positions and what potentially could be gained from moving forward. It's unlikely that either will accept the other's offer as stated -- going-in positions rarely survive the first round of debate -- but progress at least seems possible now. Pyongyang agreed that its proposed "freeze for rewards" would be a first step toward dismantlement of all its nuclear weapons programs -- a consistent U.S. demand -- and the United States agreed that rewards could come early in the process, at least from the other parties. Seoul, Beijing, Moscow and even Tokyo seem amenable to front-loading some energy and economic assistance if a verifiable freeze could be initiated.
However, it's a bit early to break out the champagne. Washington's detailed offer had been demanded by the others as a demonstration of the Bush administration's willingness to move forward. It was seen as a win for the "engagers" over administration neocons who wanted to continue to squeeze Pyongyang, despite the obvious damage this tactic was having on the U.S. relationship with South Korea and Japan. Subtle pressure by Japan was seen as instrumental in convincing President Bush that Washington had to be more forthcoming in this round of talks, as was not-so-subtle pressure from China and South Korea. It remains to be seen if Washington is ready to take "yes" for an answer if Pyongyang is smart enough to give this response.
Pyongyang's answer will be a real test of North Korea's willingness to negotiate now, rather than wait and hope for regime change in Washington come November. How Pyongyang responds will provide the best indication of its sincerity. Will it see Washington's gesture as an opportunity or as a sign of weakness to be exploited?
For its part, Washington has stopped talking about "CVID" -- complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement -- recognizing that the term carries too much political baggage, but still sees this as the only acceptable long-term outcome.
The immediate hang-up is over the word "complete." Washington continues to insist that the freeze must include Pyongyang's clandestine uranium enrichment program as well as its acknowledged plutonium-based reprocessing efforts. North Korea refuses to admit that its uranium program exists, despite overwhelming evidence -- including Pakistani nuclear scientist and proliferator extraordinaire A.Q. Khan's public confession -- and its own (since recanted) October 2002 admission that initiated the crisis.
The temptation for Pyongyang to keep stonewalling is high. Seoul has suggested that the uranium issue should be dealt with later. But as long as Pyongyang believes that its denial can drive a wedge between Washington and its negotiating partners, it is in its strategic advantage to continue to deny the program's existence.
North Korea should realize that Bush cannot yield on this point. To ignore the uranium program now does more than reward bad behavior; it says that the whole crisis was unnecessary in the first place. Both election year politics and sound strategic reasoning preclude such a step. The message this would send to Pyongyang would guarantee future crises.
Can North Korea recant and still save face? History says that it can. After decades of denying that it was kidnaping Japanese citizens, Pyongyang suddenly fessed up, "discovering" that rogue intelligence elements had been carrying on this program unbeknownst to the central government. The "implausible denial" defense was later used by Islamabad when, much to its declared shock, it discovered that the father of its bomb was running a nuclear Wal-Mart, selling technology and components to all comers (Pyongyang included). Perhaps it's time for Pyongyang to discover an A.Q. Khan in its own midst.
Waiting until November is like playing Russian roulette ... and there is no guarantee that a Kerry administration would be any more flexible on this point or that Congress would allow it to be. Perhaps it's time for both sides to test if the other can really take "yes" for an answer.
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute.