ASIAN OUTLOOK
Debates are raging among the American and South Korean security policy communities over North Korean motives and intentions and how best to deal with Pyongyang. There is only one point upon which all agree: no solution to the current standoff is practical (perhaps even possible) unless Washington and Seoul are in lock-step with each other. While Washington and Seoul may not be as far apart as many believe, significant policy and perception gaps clearly exist, which the North is busily exploiting. S. Korea should
hold a longer stick
before the NorthBy Ralph A. Cossa
One high-level South Korean official recently told me that the main difference was that "we both have a carrot-and-stick approach, but Seoul chooses to emphasize the carrots while Washington seems to favor the sticks." This widely misses the mark. While the United States has an image of speaking loudly while waving a big stick, this hardly applies in the case of North Korea. Even Washington's leading hawks are arguing for a diplomatic solution.
In truth, the United States has for many years followed a carrot-or-stick approach: Behave and you get carrots; misbehave and the sticks come out. The classic carrot-and-stick approach calls for the farmer to hold a carrot on a stick in front of a stubborn donkey, to get it to move in the right direction. Sunshine Policy critics observed that South Korea's stick was too short: The donkey was able to get the carrots without moving at all. What was needed was not necessarily a new policy, but a longer stick. How long of a stick new Republic of Korea President Roh Moo-hyun will use in pursuing his "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" remains to be seen.
In his inauguration address, Roh said he would "give priority to building trust and upholding reciprocity." It was the absence of reciprocity -- the failure of the donkey to move -- that caused concern about the Sunshine Policy's implementation. An insistence on reciprocity will help close the policy and perception gap between Washington and Seoul.
Ironically, while the United States retains its heavy-on-the-sticks image, the only country to either threaten or actually use force against North Korea in recent years is South Korea. On at least three occasions -- during the June crab fishing seasons in 1999, 2001 and 2002 -- shots were fired by South Korean navy patrol boats at intruding North Korean ships. In two instances, North Korean sailors were killed; last year, several South Korean sailors also died. The South's firm response in this most recent instance resulted in a North Korean apology. It is important to remember these precedents if the North again acts aggressively toward an unarmed U.S. reconnaissance aircraft (as it did last week) and the U.S. responds with force.
This compels me to ask an impolite question: Do South Koreans believe that fishing in disputed waters is a more serious act of aggression than the development of nuclear weapons?
President Roh is on record stating that he "would not tolerate" a nuclear weapons-equipped North Korea. In his inaugural address, he said, "Pyongyang must abandon nuclear development. If it renounces its nuclear development program, the international community will offer many things it wants." This is precisely the same as the United States' stated position.
The main difference between the two sides is Roh's statement that a pre-emptive attack on North Korea to prevent its development of nuclear weapons is "a serious issue, and at this moment I am against even consideration of such an option" and Bush's assertion that "all options" remain open, even though he's "optimistic that we'll come up with a diplomatic solution."
Let's accentuate the positive: both Bush and Roh prefer and are actively seeking a diplomatic solution; neither sees the use of force as viable at this time. Both sides also agree that South Korea should have a major voice in any solution and that the crisis impacts not only Washington and Seoul but the peninsula's neighbors, as well. They even agree that dialogue is the preferred solution and that a central aspect of this dialogue is direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang.
Why, then, can't we narrow the gap through a joint statement affirming that Washington and Seoul remain committed to a diplomatic solution, one that encompasses direct dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang in a broader setting that ensures that Seoul's voice also is heard and that the concerns of Korea's neighbors are taken into account?
And why shouldn't this communique also note that both sides are committed to a peaceful solution at this time, while acknowledging that continued aggressive behavior on the part of Pyongyang could force both allies to jointly reassess this commitment?
Ralph A. Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute, and senior editor of Comparative Connections.