Representatives from South and North Korea, China and the United States yesterday ended the first round of preparatory discussions in New York unable to agree on an agenda for their long-awaited official Four-Party Talks. A new round of talks, aimed at signing a formal peace treaty and easing tensions on the Korean peninsula, will resume next month. North and South Korea
set the peace tablePyongyang will make more demands as
preliminary Four-Party Talks get under wayThe talks were first proposed by South Korean President Kim Young-sam and President Clinton during their April 1996 summit meeting. A considerable amount of energy has been expended since then just trying to get the North to agree to show up.
Washington and Seoul have laid out some specific objectives for the talks. Their express purpose is "to initiate a process aimed at achieving a permanent peace agreement." In addition to discussions on the procedural and legal steps required to replace the current armistice with a formal peace treaty, U.S. and South Korean officials have proposed that the agenda include Korean Peninsula confidence-building measures as well.
For their part, the North Koreans have also asked for an "other" category to be included in the agenda. This is widely viewed as the means through which they will renew their quest for additional food aid, something South Korean and U.S. officials are reportedly willing to discuss (even though they rejected additional food aid as a precondition to holding the talks).
But we must be prepared for other North Korean demands as well. At a minimum, Pyongyang can be expected to call for a lifting of economic sanctions and the establishment of formal diplomatic relations with Washington. The Clinton administration already has modified some U.S. economic restrictions in place against North Korea and has expressed its willingness to exchange official liaison offices (one step below full recognition) under the terms of the 1994 agreed framework between the U.S. and Democratic People's Republic of Korea -- in which North Korea agreed to freeze its suspected nuclear weapons program and dismantle its nuclear research reactor in return for two light water reactors whose nuclear fuel is less susceptible to diversion for weapons purposes. It has been reluctant to move further in these two areas, pending significant progress on other issues, to include a resumption of North-South dialogue.
A further measured lifting of economic sanctions does seem negotiable, perhaps in return for the implementation of significant North-South confidence building measures. The establishment of formal diplomatic relations between Washington and Pyongyang is also a reasonable demand but should not precede cross-recognition between Seoul and Pyongyang or the signing of the peace treaty itself.
No to U.S. withdrawal
The U.S. and South Korea should also anticipate, and be prepared forcibly to dismiss, continued North Korean demands for the removal or dramatic reduction of U.S. military forces from the peninsula. This has been a long-standing DPRK wish and is likely to be seconded by China. But it is essential to remember that the absence of a peace treaty since 1953 has not meant renewed war, largely because of the deterrence provided by the stationing of U.S. military forces in the South.Nor will the presence of a treaty automatically guarantee peace, especially if this deterrence is removed. Until North Korea starts demilitarizing its 1.1 million man army -- the fourth largest military in the world -- and begins pulling back from its current forward-deployed locations in close proximity to the DMZ, any reduction in the U.S. presence would be foolhardy, if not fatal.
The first time that discussions about the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from the peninsula becomes appropriate is upon peaceful reunification of South AND North under one government. (In my view, a case can be made for a continued U.S. presence even after reunification, but this is clearly a subject for further debate.)
As the talks begin in earnest, both Washington and Seoul must be clear not only about what they seek but also about what they are willing -- and specifically not willing -- to give up.
In this regard, it is important to put the original Four-Party Talks proposal in its proper context. It followed in the wake of North Korean threats to unilaterally abandon the existing armistice. Instead, Pyongyang was demanding direct bilateral peace talks with the United States. In one important respect, the Four-Party Talks proposal accomplished its primary (unstated) purpose the day it was issued, by refusing to accept Pyongyang's unilateral declaration regarding the armistice and by flatly ruling out any hope of a separate peace agreement solely with the United States.
Get the right terms, or no terms
The North must not confuse U.S. and South Korea over-eagerness to get them to the table with a willingness to "pay any price" to achieve a peace treaty. Peace is better sustained by maintaining the current armistice than by reaching an agreement that puts our current deterrence posture at risk. The continued presence of U.S. troops in South Korea is for Washington and Seoul alone to decide; it should be seen as non-negotiable within the context of the Four-Party Talks.
Ralph A. Cossa is executive director of the
Pacific Forum CSIS. The opinions in View Point columns
are the authors' and are not necessarily shared by the Star-Bulletin.